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VICTIMS' COMPENSATION: CONGRESS ACTS TO
MAKE SURE THAT CRIME DOESN'T PAY-
SOMETIMES
The entertainment industry's hot pursuit of "exclusive" rights to
convicted criminals' stories' may soon cool off due to recent federal legis-
lation designed to remove the criminal's profit motive from such depic-
tions. The Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (the "Act") 2 requires that
1. See, e.g., Wilson, The Road to Emporia, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 10, 1986, (Calendar)
at 20, col. 1: Over three dozen producers invade Emporia, Kansas to obtain dramatic rights of
principals involved in a murder scandal involving the Reverend Thomas Bird and his pur-
ported lover and church secretary, Lorna Anderson. Bird was convicted of murdering his
wife, Sandra, while Bird and Anderson were convicted of soliciting the murder of Anderson's
husband, Marty. No one has yet been charged with the murder of Mr. Anderson; Wilson,
Emporia Update, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 12, 1986, (Calendar) at 89, col. 1:
CBS has jumped ahead of NBC and ABC in the great race to get those steamy
Emporia, Kan., murders on the tube.... CBS has green-lighted a script by Mike
Robe (who'll also direct) for producer Zev Braun and Interscope Communications.
Title: "Kansas Gothic."
Braun wouldn't comment on casting but said "we expect to be in production (in
Emporia) by the end of this month. An agent at William Morris said that negotia-
tions "look very good" for Keith Carradine to portray state trooper John Rule, a key
investigator in the case and the focus of the CBS pic.
Meanwhile, NBC's project - told from the viewpoint of the minister's murdered
wife and family - is still in the writing stage....
The ABC version, from exec Henry Winkler, is likewise in development. But
Winkler's project - told from the convicted lovers' point of view - may be held up by
the appeals [sic] process.
See also Timnick, High-Life "Club" Leads Rich Boys Down a Dark Path: Leader's Murder
Trial Will Reveal Dramatic Tale of Big-Money Deals, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 2, 1986, Part
II, at 1, col. 1 (concerning the murder trials of members of a Los Angeles investment group
and social fraternity known as the "Billionare Boys Club"):
The saga of rich kids, big money and murder - set against a backdrop of "in"
spots like the Hard Rock Cafe, a penthouse condo in Westwood, New York's Plaza
Hotel, respected Beverly Hills brokerage houses and Swiss banks - that has unfolded
so far in preliminary hearings and [bodyguard Jim] Pittman's first trial has not es-
caped the attention of Hollywood and the New York publishing world. There are
book, movie and television miniseries deals in the making, defendants and witnesses
alike are hustling rights to their life stories, and speculation abounds as to who will
play the unflappable, Armani-clad, Jeep-driving lead [Joe Hunt].
Id. at 3, col. 1.
2. The Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, § 1406(a), 98 Stat.
2175 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3671-3672). 18 U.S.C.A. § 3671 (West
1985) provides:
(a) Upon the motion of the United States attorney made at any time after con-
viction of a defendant for an offense against the United States resulting in physical
harm to an individual, and after notice to any interested party, the court shall, if the
court determines that the interest of justice or an order of restitution under chapter
227 or 231 of this title so requires, order such defendant to forfeit all or any part of
proceeds received or to be received by that defendant, or a transferee of that defend- -
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proceeds from such dramatizations be used to directly benefit the victim
or be deposited in a general crime victims' assistance fund or be used to
pay a portion of the criminal's legal representation. The scope of the
Act, however, is not unlimited. In United States v. MacDonald,3 ("Mac-
Donald") the federal government attempted to apply the Act to a crime
that had occurred almost fifteen years prior to its enactment. The dis-
trict court denied the government relief under the Act because such an
application violates the ex post facto clause of the United States
Constitution.4
Although the Act, as currently drafted, only concerns criminals
ant, from a contract relating to a depiction of such crime in a movie, book, newspa-
per, magazine, radio or television production, or live entertainment of any kind, or
an expression of the defendant's thoughts, opinions, or emotions regarding such
crime.
(b) An order issued under subsection (a) of this section shall require that the
person with whom the defendant contracts pay to the Attorney General any proceeds
due the defendant under such contract.
(c) (1) Proceeds paid to the Attorney General under this section shall be re-
tained in escrow in the Crime Victims' Fund in the Treasury by the Attorney Gen-
eral for five years after the date of an order under this section, but during that five
year period may-
(A) be levied upon to satisfy-
(i) a money judgment rendered by a United States district court in
favor of a victim of an offense for which such defendant has been convicted, or a legal
representative of such victim; and
(ii) pay for legal representation of the defendant in matters arising
from the offense for which such defendant has been convicted, but no more than 20
percent of the total proceeds may be so used.
(2) The court shall direct the disposition of all such proceeds in the posses-
sion of the Attorney General at the end of such five years and may require that all or,
any part of such proceeds be released from escrow and paid into the Crime Victims'
Fund in the Treasury.
(d) As used in this section, the term "interested party" includes the defendant
and any transferee of proceeds due the defendant under the contract, the person with
whom the defendant has contracted, and any person physically harmed as a result of
the offense for which the defendant has been convicted.
3. 607 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
4. Id. at 1186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 provides that, "No Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed." "Bills of attainder" are defined as "[S]uch special acts of the legis-
lature as inflict capital punishments upon persons supposed to be guilty of high offenses, such
as treason and felony, without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. If
an act inflicts a milder degree of punishment than death, it is called a 'bill of pains and penal-
ties,' but both are included in the prohibition in the Federal constitution." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 162 (rev. 4th ed. 1968), (citing Losier v. Sherman, 157 Kan. 153, 138 P.2d 272,
273 (1943) and State v. Graves, 352 Mo. 1102, 182 S.W. 2d 46, 54 (1944)). An ex post facto
law is one that is criminal or penal in nature and which changes the punishment, or inflicts a
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed, or which punishes as




whose offenses resulted in physical harm to the victim,5 considering the
aims and purposes of the Act, criminals who commit "non-violent"
crimes may be the next targets of such forfeiture proceedings. Thus,
MacDonald is important to criminals who have been convicted of "non-
violent" crimes and who have profited by selling the rights to their sto-
ries.6 In addition, the MacDonald decision has significance not only for
criminals who committed federal crimes prior to the effective date of the
Act7 and hope to profit from retelling their exploits, but also for those
who commit crimes in states with similar provisions.' The prohibition
against passing ex post facto laws is also mentioned in the Constitution as
a limitation upon the "states' " powers. 9 Consequently, MacDonald af-
fects state legislatures that enact similar forfeiture statutes immediately
after a notorious or heinous crime with the purpose of applying the law
5. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3671(a), supra note 2.
6. Such "non-violent" criminal authors include the Watergate cover-up principals: JOHN
DEAN, BLIND AMBITION: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS (1976), J. MAGRUDER, AN AMERICAN
LIFE: ONE MAN'S ROAD TO WATERGATE (1976), J. MCCORD JR., A PIECE OF TAPE; THE
WATERGATE STORY: FACT AND FICTION (1974), E. HUNT, UNDERCOVER: MEMOIRS OF AN
AMERICAN SECRET AGENT (1974); and Clifford Irving, the author of the Howard Hughes
autobiography hoax. Note, Compensating the Victim from the Proceeds of the Criminal's Story
- The Constitutionality of the New York Approach, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 93 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as "Compensating the Victim"]. More recently, R. Foster Winans, former
journalist for the Wall Street Journal, was convicted of insider trading in 1985 and published
TRADING SECRETS: SEDUCTION AND SCANDAL AT THE WALL STREET JOURNAL in 1986.
7. §§ 3671 and 3672 of Title 18 shall take effect thirty days after the date of enactment of
§ 1409 of Pub. L. 98-473 [October 12, 1984]. See § 1409(a) set out as a note under 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 10601 (West Supp. 1986).
8. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to 84 (Supp. 1981); ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.165
(1981); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (West Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
218 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9101-9103 (1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512
(West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3401 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 70, paras. 401-414 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-3.7-1 to .7-6
(Burns 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 346.165 (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1831 (West
1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 8 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 61 IA.68 (West Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1836 to 1842 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 217.265 (1983); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17
(West Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-59-40 to 80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-28A-I to 14 (Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-201 to 208
(1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1 (Vernon Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 7.68.200 to .280 (Supp. 1986); Some statutes may take the form of a prejudgment
seizure, as in New York, or a post-conviction lien, as in Florida. See Note, In Cold Type:
Statutory Approaches to the Problem of the Offender as Author, 71 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMI-
NOLOGY 255 (1980). As with the Act, any proceeds recovered are usually deposited into a
crime victims' assistance fund for the purpose of benefitting the direct victim(s) of the crime, or
crime victims in general, or both.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 provides that, "No State shall ... pass any Bill of
Attainder, [or] ex post facto Law . .. ."
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retrospectively. "
I. THE FACTS
On February 17, 1970, Dr. Jeffrey MacDonald's wife, Colette, and
daughters Kimberly, 5, and Kristen, 2, were murdered in the family's
apartment at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Jeffrey MacDonald ("Mac-
Donald"), an Army physician, was charged with their murders, but the
Army dismissed the charges in 1970.1" A reinvestigation resulted in Mac-
Donald's indictment by a federal grand jury in 1975 and ultimately, his
trial on July 16, 1979.12
On the trial's opening day, MacDonald contracted with author Joe
McGinniss ("McGinniss") to grant to McGinniss the "exclusive story
rights to the life of Dr. Jeffrey MacDonald" in return for a percentage of
any profits. 3 One month later, MacDonald was convicted on all three
murder counts. 4 Four years after his conviction'I Fatal Vision, McGin-
niss' book concerning the MacDonald case, was published. On February
17, 1984, a television feature was aired under the same name.
16
On March 13, 1984, the Victims of Crime Act was introduced to
Congress at the request of the Reagan administration as part of the Com-
prehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.17 The Act was passed on Octo-
10. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note I at 21: "Following the convictions of [Rev. Thomas] Bird
and [Lorna] Anderson, Kansas enacted legislation making it illegal for convicted felons to
profit from their crimes, with any payments to be placed in a victims' reparation fund.
Whether the law can apply retroactively to the Bird-Anderson crimes may have to be decided
in a court test case, according to authorities there." See also Justice Ventiera's insightful com-
ments on the rationale behind New York's "Son of Sam" law [N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (Mc-
Kinney 1982)]:
The sophistication of our society has embellished the field of entertainment to
the extent that reading of the "exploits" becomes an acceptable substitute for "live
performances in the Roman arena" - witness the mad rush of publishers to obtain the
literary and motion picture rights to the last days of the condemned murderer who
preferred death by execution to life imprisonment. With such an atmosphere of pub-
lic "beneficience" to the criminal, the Legislature, shocked by the large numbers of
vicarious thrill seekers and by the media trumpeting forth each little [David]
Berkowitz happening, hastened to debar Berkowitz [the "Son of Sam" or ".44 caliber
killer"] and others from profiting from their heinous misdeeds." Matter of Johnsen
(David A. Berkowitz), 103 Misc. 2d 823, 825, 430 N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (1979).
11. 607 F. Supp. at 1184.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. MacDonald was sentenced to three consecutive life terms. Id. at 1186.
15. August, 1983.
16. MacDonald, 607 F. Supp. at 1184.
17. S. REP. No. 497, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 3182, 3607 [hereinafter "S. REP. No. 497"]. "While [the Act] is the first victims
compensation and assistance bill which has been sent to Congress by a President, there has
[Vol. 7
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ber 12, 1984, to become effective thirty days thereafter.'" Subsequently,
the federal government moved, pursuant to paragraph (a) of section 3671
of the Act, for a special order of forfeiture of all proceeds received or to
be received by MacDonald arising from his contract with McGinniss. 9
Under this order, all proceeds would be forfeited to the Attorney General
and retained in escrow in the Crime Victims' Fund in the Treasury.2 °
Although apparently not clear from its moving papers,2 ' the government
also sought to compel MacDonald to forfeit any proceeds received in
settlement or judgment of a breach of contract suit which he had filed
been considerable interest in such legislation in the past. Since the 92nd Congress, the Senate
has passed victim compensation legislation seven times." Id. at 3608.
18. See supra note 7. As originally drafted, § 103 of the Act was based on New York's
"Son of Sam" law and other similar state statutes. S. REP. No. 497, supra note 17, at 3612.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982) provides in part that: "Every person ... con-
tracting with any person ... accused or convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to the
reenactment of such crime ... or from the expression of such accused or convicted person's
thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime, shall submit a copy of such
contract to the board and pay over to the board any moneys which would otherwise, by the
terms of such contract, be owing to the person so accused or convicted or his representatives."
Congress' choice of precedent was rather questionable. New York's "Son of Sam" law
was enacted in response to the crime spree of David Berkowitz, known as the "Son of Sam" or
".44 caliber killer." In Johnsen (David A. Berkowitz), 430 N.Y.S.2d at 906, Justice Ventiera
noted that "Section 632-a of the Executive Law, conceived in haste, written in haste, and
declared under the cry of the public for the Legislature to enact retribution, reflects its noble
spirit, though clothed in loose, vague and inconsistent language."
The Johnsen court went on to note that in a prior case, Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 66 A.D.2d
604, 414 N.Y.S.2d 350, 354 (1979) the Wojtowicz court had set forth a handwritten comment
found on [§ 632-a's] legislative bill jacket stating: "This bill is terribly drafted!! Its intent &
objectives should be praised, but it should be vetoed with a promise to resubmit a bill which
will (1) be clear [and] (2) have a chance of surviving a constitutional attack." Wojtowicz in-
volved application of § 632-a to John Wojtowicz, convicted of robbing a branch of the Chase
Manhattan Bank and whose crime was depicted in the 1975 film entitled "Dog Day After-
noon." Section 632-a was amended after its enactment and the Johnsen court found it to be
constitutional. 430 N.Y.S.2d at 909. Congress was well aware of the New York law's potential
constitutional problems. S. REP. No. 497, supra note 17, at 3613.
The Act, although patterned after similar states' provisions, was intended to complement
state forfeiture laws. The Congressional Committee on the Judiciary intended that "§§ 102 and
103 of [the Act] be interpreted as granting the Federal government concurrent jurisdiction
over the profits, but not preemptive authority over state actions." Id. at 3612. Thus, where the
criminal has violated both Federal and state law, if the state has a "Son of Sam" law, then the
Federal prosecutor is expected to "consult his state counterpart about who would seek to seize
the profits" and refrain from proceeding where "the interests of justice would best be served by
proceeding under state law rather than the Federal law." Id.
19. MacDonald, 607 F. Supp. at 1184. At the time of its motion, the government alleged
that MacDonald had received approximately $83,101.56 in proceeds from October 2, 1979
through August 7, 1984. Id.
20. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3671 (b) and (c) (West 1985). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 10601 (West Supp.
1986).
21. MacDonald, 607 F. Supp. at 1184.
1987]
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against McGinniss in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California.
The government set forth two theories for recovery. First, the gov-
ernment argued that the policies which underlie the Act compel the
court to require that MacDonald forfeit all of the proceeds that he re-
ceived from Fatal Vision, including those received before the effective
date of the Act.22 This result would further the Act's underlying policies
to "derive funds for the [victims' assistance] program primarily from
wrongdoers who are responsible for the suffering of victims,"23 and to
serve the interests of justice.24 Second, the government argued that even
if the Act were found to be applied ex post facto as to events occurring
before its effective date, MacDonald would be subject to its provisions to
the extent he would receive any money or enter into any contracts after
the Act's effective date.25
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina rejected both of the government's contentions, finding that the
Act satisfied the two part test for identifying an ex post facto law as set
forth in Weaver v. Graham.26 In Weaver, the petitioner, a prisoner in a
Florida prison, had challenged the constitutionality of a state statute en-
acted after his conviction which would have extended his prison sentence
by reformulating his "gain-time. '27 At the time the new statute was en-
acted, Weaver had accrued considerable gain-time. If the new statute
were applied to him, it would have increased Weaver's sentence by over
two years beyond that derived from the gain-time formula in effect at the
date of his conviction. 2 The gain-time formulation existing at the time
of trial is a "significant factor" which affects the defendant's decision to
plea bargain and is routinely taken into consideration by the sentencing
judge when calculating the length of sentence.29 Consequently, the new
statute could not apply to Weaver.3
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1185.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1186.
26. Id. at 1185-86 (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981)).
27. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 27. Gain-time is the amount of time that is reduced from a pris-
oner's sentence if the prisoner satisfies certain conditions, such as good behavior. Id. at 21 &
nn. 1-2.
28. Id. at 27.
29. Id. at 25 (citations omitted).
30. Id. The Weaver court also held that the state was prohibited from applying any "hy-
[Vol. 7
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Although the two cases differed factually, Weaver was similar to
MacDonald in two respects. First, the dates of the defendants' respective
crimes occurred before the effective date of the statutes at issue. Second,
the government attempted to apply the respective statutes to conduct of
defendants which had occurred before the effective date of the statute or,
in the alternative, to events which had occurred only after the effective
dates of the statutes.
The MacDonald court followed the two part test set forth by Justice
Marshall in Weaver to determine whether a criminal or penal law has
been applied ex post facto: "[I]t must be retrospective, that is, it must
apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage
the offender affected by it."
31
The critical event in any ex post facto analysis is the date that the
event took place-the crime.32 In MacDonald, the event occurred in
1970. But the government was attempting to apply a 1984 law to an
event that occurred in 1970. The Act would change "the legal conse-
quences of acts ... [completed by MacDonald] before [the Act's] effec-
tive date" by depriving MacDonald of the monetary benefits he had
received as a result of the crimes for which he was convicted. 33 Conse-
quently, the facts satisfied the first prong of the Weaver test.34
In MacDonald, the defendant also satisfied the second prong, which
requires a showing of disadvantage." The district court found that the
government's ultimate goal of having MacDonald "forfeit the monetary
benefits he has received from the crimes for which he was convicted" was
a disadvantage to MacDonald, regardless of the valuable aims and pur-
poses of the Act.36 Accordingly, the Act would be ex post facto as ap-
plied to MacDonald.
3 7
The government's alternative theory sought forfeiture of MacDon-
ald's post-1984 profits since they would be received after the effective
date of the Act. The district court rejected this theory as well based upon
the "well-settled rule that the critical date for ex post facto analysis is the
brid" reformulation to Weaver's sentence by combining the old statutory formulation with the
new statutory formulation. Id. at 24, 26-27.
31. 607 F. Supp. at 1185 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
32. 607 F. Supp. at 1186 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30-31, and Marshall v. Garrison,
659 F.2d 440, 442 n.3 (4th Cir. 1981)).
33. 607 F. Supp. at 1185-86 (citing Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31).
34. 607 F. Supp. at 1185.




LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
date on which the crime was committed by the criminal defendant."38
MacDonald's crime was committed in 1970. Thus, the government
could not impose any additional punishment on him, including invoking
forfeiture provisions on proceeds received before or after the effective
date of the Act.39
III. ANALYSIS OF THE Ex POST FACTO CHALLENGE TO THE ACT"°
The district court's rejection of the government's emotionally ap-
pealing arguments strongly reaffirmed the policy underlying the prohibi-
tion against ex post facto laws, the purposes of which are to provide fair
notice of which acts will subject the perpetrator to criminal sanctions,
and to prevent vindictive criminal legislation.41 Accordingly, the ex post
facto prohibition is only relevant to criminal laws and not to civil
statutes.42
38. Id. at 1185-86 (citing Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30-31 and Marshall, 659 F.2d at 442 n.3).
39. 607 F. Supp. at 1186.
40. The district court noted, but declined to rule on the remaining constitutional
arguments set forth by MacDonald, that the Act is unconstitutional because it "(1) chills
speech protected by the First Amendment; (2) violates the due process clause and is a taking of
property under the Fifth Amendment; and (3) impairs a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel." MacDonald, 607 F. Supp. at 1186 n.5.
These objections, although not within the scope of this article, have been the subject of
other articles concerned with similar forfeiture provisions. See, e.g., Note, Compensating the
Victim from the Proceeds of the Criminal's Story - The Constitutionality of the New York
Approach, 14 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 93 (1978); Note, In Cold Type: Statutory Approaches
to the Problem of Offender as Author, 71 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 255 (1980); Note,
Criminals-Turned-Authors: Victims' Rights v. Freedom of Speech, 54 IND. L.J. 443 (1979);
Note, Publication Rights Agreements in Sensational Criminal Cases: A Response to the Problem,
68 CORNELL L.R. 686 (1983) (citing Am. Law Division, Cong. Research Service, Lib. of
Congress, Constitutional Analysis of a New York Statute Requiring Funds Received by Alleged
Criminals for Certain Purposes to be given to Their Victims, Sept. 8, 1977).
41. Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1546 & nn. 10-11 (1 lth Cir. 1984) (citing Weaver, 450
U.S. at 30: "Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual's right to less
punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature in-
creases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated," and
Warren v. United States Parole Commission, 659 F.2d 183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1981): "From the
outset ... the ex post facto clauses have been understood to have been principally aimed at
curtailing legislative abuses.").
42. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 396 (1798). But see, Cummings v. Missouri, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) (retrospective application of loyalty oath is ex post facto where
punishment for refusal to swear was a criminal offense and result was to forbid priest from
teaching or preaching); and Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 385 (1878) ("Act of Congress to
collect tax penalty, although enforceable by civil suit, cannot be applied retroactively, because
had the proceeding against defendant been taken by indictment instead of suit for excess tax,
and the one was equally authorized with the other, the proceeding would certainly have fallen
within the description of an ex post facto law.").
[Vol. 7
VICTIMS' COMPENSATION
A. Is the Act a "Criminal" Law?
The character of a forfeiture proceeding, that is whether it is civil or
criminal in nature, depends on the statute under which the forfeiture is
sought to be enforced.43 By its wording the Act contains both penal and
civil remedies. That is, the goverment must move, after a conviction but
in conjunction with the criminal proceeding, for an order of special for-
feiture under section 3671 paragraph (a) of the Act. Any proceeds recov-
ered by the government are then deposited into the Crime Victims'
Assistance Fund (the "Fund"). The Fund may be used to satisfy any
money judgment obtained by the victim, or the victim's legal representa-
tive, against the convicted criminal in a civil proceeding pursuant to sec-
tion 3671 paragraph (c) of the Act.
The district court correctly applied the ex post facto analysis be-
cause a forfeiture proceeding, although civil in form, may be criminal in
nature. 4 For example, a statute may provide that the proposed forfei-
ture proceeding be presented with the indictment in a criminal case.45
Thus, criminal forfeiture proceedings must be distinguished from purely
civil forfeiture proceedings. Criminal forfeiture proceedings, such as
those contemplated by the Act, must be brought in connection with the
underlying criminal conviction. Their effect, as will be seen, is to increase
or detrimentally alter the punishment for a crime, and so are criminal in
nature. They are brought by the government, on behalf of the people and
so are distinguishable from those civil forfeiture actions that solely con-
cern a dispute between private individuals. The result of this distinction
is that under the Act, a victim, even with a civil judgment in hand
against the defendant, would not be able to obtain relief under the Act in
the absence of a prior criminal conviction.
B. Did the Act Increase or Alter MacDonald's
Punishment or Sentence?
The second prong of the ex post facto analysis requires that a law
create a crime out of an act that was innocent when done or increase or
detrimentally alter the punishment for a crime after it has been commit-
ted.46 By its language, the Act does not create a new crime. Further, the
Act's forfeiture proceeding does not technically "alter" the punishment
43. 37 C.J.S. Forfeiture § 5 at 15 (1943).
44. Id. "Where it may be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal
in its nature it cannot be considered as civil." (citations omitted).
45. 37 C.J.S. supra at 15.
46. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390.
1987]
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
or sentence originally "annexed" to MacDonald's crime,47 in the same
manner as the "gain-time" formulation in Weaver did not "technically"
alter Weaver's original sentence or punishment.4" This lack of technical
annexation, however, will not prevent it from being considered as in-
creasing or detrimentally altering MacDonald's punishment.49 As the
Supreme Court noted in Weaver, "[a] statute may be retrospective even if
it alters punitive conditions outside the sentence, as where a statute re-
quiring solitary confinement prior to execution is applied to someone
who committed a capital offense prior to its enactment, but not when
applied only prospectively." "0
Thus, the court properly concluded that MacDonald was entitled to
all of the proceeds resulting from dramatizations of his criminal acts. In
doing so, the court acted in conformity with the ultimate goal of the ex
post facto clause: to prevent vindictive criminal legislation.
IV. IS THE ACT VULNERABLE TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES?
Although the district court declined to consider MacDonald's other
constitutional challenges to the Act,5 in light of the Act's intent, it ap-
pears to be vulnerable to a challenge not raised by MacDonald - that
the Act violates the equal protection clause.52 One of the stated purposes
of the Act is "[t]o improve federal assistance to the victims of federal
crime."53 Nothing, however, in the legislative history suggests a ration-
ale for limiting its application to only "violent offenders," that is, those
47. That is, any forfeiture presumably will not appear as part of MacDonald's record or
be a condition of restitution or a term of his parole or release.
48. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31.
49. See also Cummings, 71 U.S. at 325: "The Constitution deals with substance, not
shadows. Its inhibition was leveled at the thing, not the name. It intended that the rights of the
citizen should be secure against deprivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, under
any form, however disguised. If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment, its
insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding."
50. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
5 1. See supra note 40.
52. U.S.CONsT. amend. V provides that: "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ...." Although the fifth amendment does not contain
an equal protection clause as contained in the fourteenth amendment, which applies to the
states, the Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment forbids
the federal government from denying equal protection of the laws. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S.
93, 94-95 n.1 (1979). Further, the Supreme Court's approach to fifth amendment claims has
always been precisely the same as with equal protection claims under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 639 n.2 (1975).
53. S. REP. No. 497, supra note 17, at 3611.
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whose crimes result in physical harm.54 Thus, the language of the Act
appears to expressly exclude those victims who suffer only property dam-
age or are victims of "white-collar" crime. By creating this discrimina-
tory classification, the Act seems ripe for such an equal protection
challenge.55
Historically, courts are quite reluctant to overturn a statute unless it
burdens a suspect class or a fundamental interest which distinguishes be-
tween classes.56 Thus, as a first step, a convicted criminal must show that
a fundamental right, which is either explicitly or implicitly protected by
the Constitution, has been infringed. 57 The courts will probably not ac-
cord a violent criminal's right to profit from his or her crime the same
protection afforded other recognized fundamental rights.58
Absent a showing that a burden on a fundamental right exists, a
convicted criminal would have to show that he is a member of a suspect
class. The indicia of a "suspect class" include whether the class is one
that is (1) saddled with such disabilities, or (2) subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or (3) relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.59
A convicted criminal could probably not satisfy these criteria suffi-
ciently to justify a court overturning the Act. For example, certain crimi-
nal classes, particularly those convicted of violent crimes or felonies,
54. S. REP. No. 497, supra note 17, at 3610, states that the first section of S. 2423, as
amended by the Committee on the Judiciary, "contains a finding that it is against public policy
for a criminal to profit from the glorification of his crime or to encourage lawlessness among
others." (emphasis added) Id. at 3610. Further, § 101 is to establish a crime victims' assist-
ance fund which would receive, among other things "all royalties and other monies paid to a
convicted Federal defendant as a result of any contract to depict his crime in the media. The
purpose of this provision is to derive funds for the program primarily from wrongdoers who
are responsible for the suffering of victims." Id. at 3611. (emphasis added).
55. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a, after which the Act was patterned, also suffers from this
unequal classification. See, e.g., Compensating the Victim, supra note 6, at 118: "The victim
should be compensated from the criminal's profits, regardless of the nature of his loss." (cita-
tion omitted).
56. Vance, 440 U.S. at 96-97.
57. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, reh'g de-
nied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
58. Such rights include the right to marry (Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)), the
right of privacy (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973)), and the right
of procreation (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)). But see Compensating the Victim,
supra note 6, at 118 (finding that New York's "Son of Sam" law violates the first amendment):
"When the denial of equal protection 'plainly involves expressive conduct within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment ... discriminations ... must be tailored to serve a substantial
governmental interest.' "
59. 16A AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 750 at 815 (1979).
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have long been subjected to statutes prohibiting or restricting the terms
of their parole, probation or suspension of sentences.' Despite this dis-
parity, courts have uniformly upheld such classifications against equal
protection challenges. 61 Courts consistently find such classifications ad-
vance legitimate legislative goals in a rational fashion.62 The rational
standard test, employed by the courts in judging such statutes, 63 is a min-
imal standard which the government should easily meet, given the rela-
tively narrow terms of the Act and its legislative history.'M
Even where, as here, the statute does not completely achieve its goal
of preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes, adequate reason
to strike down the Act as unconstitutional does not exist. The equal pro-
tection clause does not require that all evils of the same genus be eradi-
cated.6" A legislature may proceed a step at a time and partially eliminate
the perceived evil, thereby deferring complete regulation to the future.66
Even though the Act appears to be insulated against an equal pro-
tection challenge, a more equitable law would provide that all criminals,
both violent and non-violent, are subject to forfeiture proceedings. Pro-
ceeds received from such "non-violent" criminals, even though not sub-
ject to distribution to an individual claimant in a number of cases, 67
could be deposited into a general victims' assistance fund and distributed
according to the remainder of section 3671 paragraph (c) of the Act.68
This would more effectively implement the goals of the Act.6 9
60. For example, a statute which prohibits probation to persons convicted of the crime of
recklessly or maliciously possessing a destructive device has been upheld (People v. Westoby,
63 Cal. App. 3d 790, 134 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1976)) as well as a statute which imposes the death
sentence or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on a defendant who kills a
known police or peace officer, while the officer is performing his or her official duties (Barnes v.
State, 263 Ind. 320, 330 N.E.2d 743 (1973)).
61. Annotation, Validity of Statutes Prohibiting or Restricting Parole, Probation, or Suspen-
sion of Sentence in Cases of Violent Crime, 100 A.L.R.3d 431, 442-52 (1980).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).
64. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text and infra note 69.
65. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
66. See, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
67. For example, white collar crimes such as computer "hacking" or violation of certain
securities laws would be almost impossible to distribute directly to its "victims." See generally,
Compensating the Victim, supra note 6, at 118 n. 128.
68. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3671(c) (West 1985).
69. "The purpose of [the Act].. .is to provide limited Federal funding to the States, with
minimal bureaucratic 'strings attached,' for direct compensation and service programs to assist
victims of crime, including victims of Federal crime. In addition, it provides funds to improve
Federal efforts which assist crime victims and establishes a Federal Victim of Crime Advisory
Committee." S. REP. No. 497, supra note 17, at 3607; See also supra notes 53-54.
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V. PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF THE ACT.
In ruling that MacDonald was not subject to any provisions of the
Act, the district court was not required to determine the permissible
scope of the Act. The Act is vague in its scope in two areas: (1) the type
of proceeds the government may obtain, and (2) the type of victims it is
intended to benefit.
In MacDonald, the government not only wanted proceeds from Fa-
tal Vision, but it seemed to seek all proceeds resulting from MacDonald's
breach of contract suit against McGinniss.7 ° The plain language of the
Act states that the proceeds subject to forfeiture are "those received or to
be received by the defendant... from a contract relating to a depiction of
such crime ... ." " Although this language does not provide for forfei-
ture of settlement or judgment proceeds, one could argue that an "equita-
ble" interpretation of the Act supports forfeiture of any proceeds,
however received, from a convicted criminal who has profited from a de-
piction of his crime. The legislative history of the Act provides addi-
tional support. "The Crime Victims' Assistance Fund is to receive all
royalties and other monies paid to a convicted Federal defendant as a
result of any contract to depict his crime in the media."72 The noun "re-
sult" is defined as "something that results as a consequence, issue, or
conclusion." 73 Since MacDonald's lawsuit for breach of contract was a
consequence of his contract, the government may have had more than an
equitable argument as support for its contention.
Given the policy behind the Act, it may be argued that the most
equitable approach is for all proceeds that "result" from a contract, as
well as any proceeds that are collaterally related to a depiction of the
crime, to be amenable to forfeiture. Consequently, all proceeds from a
grant, award, stipend or Pulitzer Prize that result from a depiction of the
crime, and not merely from the contract itself, and payable to the crimi-
nal or his transferee, would be subject to forfeiture proceedings.74 Per-
haps in an attempt to avoid any first amendment freedom of speech or
due process challenge, the Act properly limits its scope to forfeiture of
70. 607 F. Supp. 1184.
71. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3671(a) (West 1985) (emphasis added).
72. S. REP. No. 497, supra note 17, at 3611 (emphasis added).
73. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 987 (1979).
74. For an example of the problems administrators have in determining what constitutes a
"depiction of the crime" under such statutes, see, e.g., Los Angeles Times, Aug. 31, 1986,
(Book Review) col. 1, at 11: The publisher for Jean Harris, convicted of murdering Scarsdale
diet inventor Dr. Herman Tarnower, may appeal a ruling by New York State Crime Victims
Board declaring that Harris' book falls under New York's "Son of Sam" law. The publisher
maintains that Harris' book does not concern the crime, but concerns prison reform.
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proceeds payable to the criminal or his transferee.75
The Act may also be too narrow in the scope of the victims it seeks
to benefit. The Act allows the Fund to be used only to satisfy a money
judgment rendered in favor of a "victim of an offense for which such
defendant has been convicted ... "76 As it appears, it would be possible
for the following scenario to exist: the defendant is charged with two
crimes, for example murder and rape, and is acquitted of the rape charge;
the victim may still obtain a civil judgment against defendant for dam-
ages arising out of an assault and battery on the rape. Under the terms of
the Act, the victim would not be able to levy against the Fund in this
instance, even though there may be proceeds in the Fund arising out of
the murder conviction, because the victim is not a "victim of an offense
for which defendant was convicted." Because of this narrow language
this victim would be in the same position as before the existence of the
Act, with a judgment in hand and the only means of execution upon the
defendant's personal assets. Given the intent and policy of the Act, this
anomolous result is surely not what Congress intended.
VI. CONCLUSION
In addition to reaffirming the policies underlying the prohibition
against applying laws in an ex post facto manner, the MacDonald deci-
sion also represents the importance of careful legislative drafting. The
Act, although it is an admirable public policy statement and has specific
legislative goals, cannot be applied in a vindictive, retrospective manner,
no matter how heinous the crime or notorious the criminal. At the same
time, it is apparent that the scope of the Act is too narrow in the type of
proceeds it may reach and the type of victim it intends to benefit, and
unfair in subjecting only violent criminals to forfeiture proceedings.
Congress, if it is serious about making sure that crime does not pay,
should act to immediately correct these defects in the Act.7 7
Michele DelRosso Murphy
75. "The Committee amendment refers to money payable to the defendant's 'transferee,'
rather than 'any other party.' This is to ensure that innocent parties, such as Truman Capote,
the author of 'In Cold Blood' or other authors who have not participated in criminal conduct
and who wish to depict the defendant's crime, are not affected by the proposed ... change." S.
REP. No. 497, supra note 17 at 3612.
76. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3671(c)(1)(A)(i) (West 1985).
77. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3671 should be amended to read as follows:
(a) Upon motion of the United States attorney made at any time after convic-
tion of a defendant for an offense against the United States and after notice to any
interested party, the court shall, if the court determines that the interest of justice or
an order of restitution under chapter 227 or 231 of this title so requires, order such
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defendant to forfeit all or any part of proceeds received or to be received by that
defendant, or a transferee of that defendant, from a contract, award, judgment, settle-
ment or other monetary payment which arises from or is related to a depiction of such
crime in a movie, book, newspaper, magazine, radio or television production, or live
entertainment of any kind, or an expression of the defendant's thoughts, opinions, or
emotions regarding such crime.
(b) An order issued under subsection (a) of this section shall require that the
person with whom the defendant contracts, or from whom any award, judgment, set-
tlement, or other monetary payment is due, pay to the Attorney General any such
proceeds or payment.
(c) (1) Proceeds paid to the Attorney General under this section shall be re-
tained in escrow in the Crime Victims' Fund in the Treasury by the Attorney Gen-
eral for five years after the date of an order under this section, but during that five
year period may-
(A) be levied upon to satisfy-
(i) a money judgment rendered by a United States district court in
favor of a victim of any offense for which such defendant has been convicted, or a
legal representative of such victim; and
(ii) pay for legal representation of the defendant in matters arising
from the offense for which such defendant has been convicted, but no more than 20
percent of the total proceeds may be so used.
(2) The court shall direct the disposition of all such proceeds in the posses-
sion of the Attorney General at the end of such five years and may require that all or
any part of such proceeds be released from escrow and paid into the Crime Victims
Fund in the Treasury.
(d) As used in this section, the term "interested party" includes the defendant
under the contract, or who is entitled to receive any monetary payment, the person with
whom the defendant has contracted or from whom defendant is entitled to receive any
payment, and any person who has suffered physical harm or incurred damages as a
result of any offense for which the defendant has been convicted.
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